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The Croat-Muslim war (1992-1994): Conclusion


Even as the situation in central Bosnia deteriorated in late January and early February, 1994, UNPROFOR and ECMM monitors began to receive an increased number of reports that the Croatian Army was intervening in the Muslim-Croat conflict in Herzegovina. Convoys and troop movements from Tomislavgrad toward Prozor and the Gornji Vakuf area were reported, and the ABiH claimed-incorrectly-that some ten thousand Croatian soldiers in seven or eight HV brigades were in the central Bosnia area. However, Croatian official Jadranko Prlic conceded only that a few former HV soldiers were there: some twenty-six hundred "volunteers" born in Bosnia- Herzegovina who had returned to defend "their country."

As the Croatian Army's involvement in Herzegovina became increasingly obvious, the UN Security Council considered sanctions against Croatia. Then, despite a year of often intense conflict between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States succeeded in bringing off something of a diplomatic coup by getting both sides to the conference table, forcing them to agree to stop the fighting and once more cooperate in their common defense against the Serbs. This was accomplished by showing a bit of carrot as well as the Security Council stick as the United States offered Croatia economic aid in return for the withdrawal of its forces and assistance in bringing about a Muslim-Croat cease-fire in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The combination was effective, and the cease-fire agreed upon in Washington went into effect on February 25, 1994, thus ending the Muslim-Croat civil war. A new Muslim-Croat federation was formed that subsequently entered into a defense pact with Croatia against the Bosnian Serbs and their Serbian/Yugoslav allies.

Although the fundamental issues dividing Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were not resolved, the Washington agreements did end the fighting and allow the Muslim-Croat alliance to concentrate on fending off the principal aggressor in the region, the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, the ABiH was able to mount an offensive against the BSA in north-central Bosnia the same month that the Muslim-Croat alliance was renewed. However, as Sir Martin Garrod noted: "There is still basic mistrust of the Muslims by the Croats, particularly in Hercegovina, who will not forget that it was they with, they say, just a small contribution from the Muslims who 'liberated' Mostar from the Serbs, armed the BiH to fight with the HVO against the Serbs and welcomed the Muslim DPs into Mostar and Hercegovina-only to be 'stabbed in the back' by the Muslims when they attacked them."1

Badgered during the Kordic-Cerkez trial by Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice to reveal who had coordinated the events in Vitez on April 16, 1993, Maj. Zeljko Sajevic, the former operations officer of the Viteska Brigade, responded, "If you are referring to the attack which took place on the 16th of April, in the morning, then you have to look for that coordinator amongst the ranks of the BH army, because they were the attackers."2 Indeed, as Major Sajevic so succinctly pointed out, the Croatian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their defense forces, the HVO, were not the aggressors in the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia between November, 1992, and March, 1994. While certainly suspicious and wary of their Muslim neighbors, the Bosnian Croats did not plan or execute a systematic campaign of dispossession and extermination against their half-hearted allies in the fight against the Bosnian Serbs. Focused on and fully committed to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serb Army, the HVO was genuinely surprised by the planned offensive mounted by the ABiH and its radical auxiliaries against the Croat positions in central Bosnia that began in January, 1993. Consequently, the HVO was forced to react to protect the key military industrial facilities within the Croat enclaves, the vital lines of communications to the outside, and simply to preserve Croat enclaves intact and protect their inhabitants. Heavily outnumbered and outgunned, the HVO adopted a classic "active defense" and proceeded at great cost to defend its homes, production facilities, and people. Despite successful counteroffensives to clear key terrain and open internal lines of communication, as time went on, the HVO was increasingly subjected to the attrition of men and material even as its Muslim opponents grew stronger and pressed harder. Only the Washington agreements of February, 1994, saved the Bosnian Croats from decimation and expulsion from the territory in central Bosnia remaining under their control.

Contrary to the assertions of the Muslim-led government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, various Muslim participants, journalists, and some UNPROFOR, ECMM, and nongovernmental organization observers, the HVO, surrounded and heavily outnumbered, had neither the means nor the opportunity to engage in a planned program to attack, dispossess, and expel Muslims from the areas in which they lived. Nor did it have sufficient motive for such an improbable campaign. As Maj. Gen. Filip Filipovic noted, the HVO had its "hands full with the defense against the Army of Republika Srpska."3 It did, however, have the means, the motive, and the necessity to defend itself-which it did, vigorously and often at the risk of being mistaken for the aggressor by observers with only an imperfect knowledge of the local situation and a distorted view of the bigger picture. In central Bosnia, what one saw was not always what it seemed to be at the time.

Whatever the larger conflict involving the Bosnian Serbs may have been, the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats in central Bosnia was clearly a civil war. Although considerable confusion was created by the wearing of Croatian Army insignia by Bosnian Croat veterans of the war between Croatia and the Serbs/JNA and by the Croatian Anny's intervention in Herzegovina during the waning days of the conflict, no Croatian Army units were introduced into central Bosnia nor, as far as can be determined, were there ever any official advisers, staff officers, or the like from the HV serving with the HVO in the OZCB area of operations. The only foreign combatants introduced into central Bosnia were the radical mujahideen from various Muslim countries invited in by Alija Izetbegovic's government.

Indeed, the available evidence, taken as a whole, clearly shows that the forces of the Muslim-led government of Bosnia-Herzegovina were the aggressors in the Muslim-Croat civil war of November, 1992-March, 1994. Only the ABiH had the means, the motive, and the opportunity required to carry out a comprehensive campaign against the Croatian community in central Bosnia. At one level, the ABiH's aggressive actions can be seen as a legitimate effort by the central government in Sarajevo to control its national territory, to suppress separatist groups, and to secure vital industrial facilities and lines of communication. Insofar as the Muslim offensive adhered to those goals and utilized straightforward military means, it can be argued that its aims and methods were lawful and legitimate, the counter-claims for legitimacy of the HVO notwithstanding. However, by their own admission, the ABiH leaders, particularly those in the III Corps area, were extremists who followed a conscious policy of aggression against the Bosnian Croats while accusing the HVO of the very crimes they themselves were committing. In any event, whether by policy decision or by inability to prevent it, the ABiH allied itself with radical Muslim factions and units raised internally as well as groups of ideologically radical Muslim fighters from abroad (the mujahideen) who the ABiH could not or would not control, and whose aims and objectives were far more sinister than credulous journalists and restricted international observers could see.

Civil wars are seldom neat and clean, and the Muslim-Croat war in central Bosnia between November, 1992, and March, 1994, was no exception. In the heat of ethnic and ideological passion and in the fog of battle many things were done by both sides that cannot be condoned under the laws of land warfare agreed upon by the majority of the world's governments. Soldiers of both the ABiH and the HVO committed murder, rape, wanton destruction, and pillage, as well as unlawfully detaining and torturing people in the course of otherwise legitimate military operations. Yet such atrocities often were the result of private quarrels and animosities having nothing whatsoever to do with the "official" opposition of the two parties.4 Indeed, the impact of criminal elements-including black-marketeers and traditional bandits, as well as individuals seeking private vengeance-has yet to be fully assessed. Thus, what might appear superficially to have been a war crime committed by the armed forces of one party on the civilian adherents of the other party may actually turn out to have been the result of a vendetta, or a criminal squabble over the division of spoils or spheres of influence. Such certainly appears to be the case with the massacre at Stupni Do, and in large part explains the frequent holdup and extortion of humanitarian aid convoys traversing the central Bosnia area.

The aims and objectives of the more radical elements of the ABiH and their mujahideen auxiliaries clearly encompassed the elimination of the Roman Catholic Croats from central Bosnia and the settlement of Muslim refugees in their place, the expropriation of Croat property, the establishment of a fundamentalist Muslim state in Europe, and even the ritual murder of both HVO soldiers and Bosnian Croat civilians. By their failure to control those radical elements, or even to condemn them publicly, the Muslim political and military leaders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina bear a heavy guilt that, with only a few exceptions, they have yet to be called upon to expiate before the international community of nations. 5

Questions of guilt and responsibility for aggression and war crimes aside, from a strictly military point of view, the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia offers four important insights for contemporary political and military leaders. First, the Muslim-Croat conflict epitomizes the Clausewitzian dictum that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." The goals sought by both sides in the conflict were ultimately political in nature, having to do with the shape of the newly independent Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina and who was to rule what part of it. When political solutions to the central questions were not forthcoming, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats resorted to force as a means of deciding them. Yet, in the end they were forced to return to political means to resolve what had become an intolerable conflict that threatened to destroy the new republic. At that point, the Muslims and Croats stood Clausewitz on his head, making politics the continuation of war by other means. The formation of the fragile Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina did nothing to resolve the key issues over which the two sides were fighting. Since February, 1994, the conflict has only changed form. Political maneuvering, war crimes charges, and the character assassination of opposition leaders have replaced combat actions as both sides continue to seek their goals.

The Muslim-Croat conflict also highlights the continuing importance of logistical factors in the conduct of modern war. The conflict in large measure arose from the attempt to secure industrial facilities of military importance and the lines of communication in central Bosnia. Moreover, severe logistical limitations-shortages of arms, ammunition, and other supplies, and the embargo on such goods imposed by the United Nations-affected both the ABiH and the HVO and dictated many of their strategic and tactical decisions. Indeed, few recent armed conflicts have reflected so clearly the central importance of controlling the means of military production and distribution and the impact of logistical considerations on war making.

The conflict also reiterated the destructiveness of modern warfare, even when conducted in a limited space by relatively small and poorly armed forces without access to airpower or the latest high-technology weapons. In 1994, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that some 150,000 to two hundred thousand persons were killed and an equal number wounded in the three-way conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina between and 1992 and 1994. The number of homes, businesses, public buildings, and the other parts of the nation's infrastructure destroyed was enormous, and the UN high commissioner for refugees estimated that at the beginning of 1994, there were some 4.3 million people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who required relief services, 3.5 million of whom were classified as refugees or displaced persons.

Finally, the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia epitomizes a new ear a type of warfare characteristic of the last quarter of the twentieth century and the probable dominant form of armed conflict in the world for the foreseeable future: the intrastate conflict between religious and ethnic groups, seeking to control a given territorial space. This new form of war resembles traditional tribal warfare or the nationalist struggles of the nineteenth century rather than the ideologically inspired "wars of national liberation" and other forms of Cold War conflict common between 1945 and 1985. The goals emergence of religious/ethnic-based civil war leading to the fragmentation of post-World War II nation states and their former colonies poses substantial problems for the United States and the democratic nations of Europe and Asia. This new form of conflict requires a complete rethinking of national strategy, means, and methods. Above all, it calls into question the viability of the prevailing doctrine of "stability above all." The strategy of maintaining stability at all costs has been shown to be ineffective at best, and often counterproductive in dealing with conflicts such as those precipitated by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Rather than seeking to maintain stability at all costs, Western leaders must devise effective methods for controlling change and directing aspirations for national, religious, and ethnic solidarity in positive rather than negative directions. As political analysts and military planners in the West search for solutions to such fundamental questions, they would do well to examine in depth the complex causes and conduct of the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia in 1992-94.

_____________________________________

1 Garrod to HQ, ECMM, Apr. 18, 1993, para. 31, KC D119/1.
2 Sajevic, Kordic-Cerkez trial testimony, July 27, 2000.
3 Filipovic, Kordic-Cerkez trial testimony, July 27, 2000.
4 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 2:7 "Most of the abuses attributable to Bosnian Croatian and Muslim forces are perpetrated by individuals and do not appear to be part of a premeditated plan of the Bosnian government or the authorities of the self-proclaimed ‘Community of Herceg-Bosna.’"
5 To date, the ICTY has indicted only four senior ABiH officials (Sefer Halilovic, Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Alagic, and Amir Kubura), and the offenses for which they have been indicted are relatively minor and restricted in scope. No Muslim political leaders have been indicted.

 

 

Source: HercegBosna.org

Prelude to Civil War in Central Bosnia

Written 08.12.2009. 11:23
The fall of Jajce to the Bosnian Serb army on October 29, 1992, marked the beginning of open conflict between the Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia. Until that time, the two communities had maintained an uneasy alliance against the BSA, but the tension between them grew during the course of 1991-92. The HVO and ABiH squabbled over the distribution of arms seized from the JNA, and there were numerous local incidents of violence by one group against the other. However, only in the last quarter of 1992 did Muslim-Croat disagreements begin to rise to the level of civil war.

In January, 1993, the building animosity transformed into open conflict as the ABiH, strengthened by large numbers ofMuslim refugees and the arrival of the mujahideen, mounted a probing attack against their HVO allies. Muslim extremists, abetted by the Izetbegovic government and fervent nationalists within the ABiH, planned and initiated offensive action against their erstwhile ally in the hope of securing control of the key military industries and lines of communication in central Bosnia ang clearing the region for the resettlement of the thousands of Muslims displaced by the fighting against the BSA elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There is, of course, no "smoking gun" - no operations plan or policy decision document that proves beyond a doubt the ABiH planned and carried out an attack on the Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia with such objectives. The time and place at which the plan was approved, and who proposed and who approved it, remain unknown. Did a written document outlining the plan ever exist? Probably. Does a copy of that document still exist? Probably deep in the ABiH's archives. Will it ever be produced for public scrutiny? Probably not - for rather obvious reasons. On the other hand, neither does such clear evidence exist to support the oft-repeated hypothesis of journalists, UNPROFOR and ECMMpersonnel, and Muslim propagandists that the HVO planned and carried out such an offensive against the Muslims. The answer to the key question of who planned and initiated the conflict between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia can only be determined by carefully evaluating the thousands of fragments of evidence and fitting them into a coherent pattern showing means, motive, and opportunity in the same way a detective arrives at a viable reconstruction of a crime. The process is tedious, but it produces reliable results. When applied to the events in central Bosnia between November, 1992, and March, 1994, it leads to just one conclusion: only the ABiH had the necessary means, motive, and opportunity; it was, in fact, the ABiH, not the HVO, that developed a strategic offensive plan and attempted to carry it out.

HVO-ABiH Cooperation in the Battle against the Serbs

At the beginning of the conflict with the Bosnian Serbs, the HVO attempted to strengthen coordination in the Muslim and Croat alliance. In mid-April, 1992, the HVO requested that RBiH president Alija Izetbegovic create a joint military headquarters to govern both the HVO and the Muslim-led Territorial Defense forces, but Izetbegovic ignored the request and the issue was never put on the agenda of any meeting of the RBiH Presidency, despite repeated pleas from Croat members of the Presidency. Efforts to improve coordination at the local level also met with Muslim indifference and obstruction. In central Bosnia, the HVO and TO attempted to form a joint military unit to defend against the BSA onslaught. In early 1992, the Vitez Municipality Crisis Staff proposed the establishment of a joint Vitez Brigade made up of a battalion from the HVO and one from the TO. A Croat, Franjo Nakic, would serve as commander, and a Muslim, Sefkija Didic, would be both deputy commander and chief of staff. The rest of the staff would be composed of both HVO and TO officers. However, the Muslims' foot- dragging and quibbling regarding the proposed brigade antagonized the Croats, who increasingly left the Territorial Defense forces for the HVO, which was farther along in its preparations to defend against the Serbs.

Nevertheless, by mid-1992, the hastily assembled and armed HVO and TO forces, with some assistance from the Croatian armed forces, managed to establish a defensive line against the more numerous and much better equipped Bosnian Serb army. However, the BSA had surrounded Sarajevo, the RBiH capital, and the scratch Muslim and Croat forces faced the superior Serb forces on several fronts ringing the newly declared state. The co-operating HVO and Muslim forces faced significant BSA threats in both eastern and western Herzegovina, and a predominantly Muslim army struggled to retain control of several eastern Bosnia towns invested by the BSA. Of principal concern to the commanders of the HVO OZCB and the ABiH III Corps in central Bosnia were an eastern front running from Hadzici north to the Visoko-llijas area; a northern front in the Maglaj-Doboj-Teslic-Tesanj area; and a western front in the area extending from Jajce southward to Donji Vakuf and Bugojno. In all three areas, the RBiH's HVO and Muslim forces struggled to hold back the BSA advance.

The Growth of Muslim-Croat Hostility, March, 1992-January, 1993

Tensions between Muslims and Croats increased steadily throughout the course of 1992 as the two sides vied for political power in the various municipalities in central Bosnia; squabbled over the division of the spoils left by the JNA, which abandoned Bosnia-Herzegovina in May, 1992; sought to gain control over key localities and facilities; and acted to protect their communities from all comers. Despite growing tensions and a number of armed confrontations, the HVO and ABiH continued to cooperate in the defense against the Bosnian Serbs backed by the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the remnants of the JNA. However, three essentially unrelated incidents in late October-just before Jajce fell to the BSA - signalled the coming conflict: the Novi Travnik gas station incident, the assassination of the HVO commander in Travnik, and the Muslim roadblock at Ahmici. These incidents led to a flare-up of small-scale Muslim-Croat fighting throughout the region that was tamped down by an UNPROFOR arranged cease-fire. Tensions and incidents increased substantially following Jajce's fall and the consequent influx of Muslim refugees, many of them armed, into the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica region. At the same time, the mujahideen presence in central Bosnia began to make itself felt, and the ABiH began to infiltrate armed cadres into the villages and to position regular ABiH units in the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica valley in preparation for the planned offensive.

Following numerous Muslim-Croat disagreements and confrontations in the Busovaca area, HVO authorities took over the Busovaca municipal government on May 10, blockading the town, demanding the surrender of weapons by the Muslim-dominated TO units, issuing arrest warrants for prominent Muslims, guaranteeing the security and eventual evacuation of JNA elements from the Kaonik area, and mobilizing the Croats in the town. Moreover, the Croat authorities announced that the Busovaca HVO would take over all JNA weapons, equipment, and barracks in the local area. The Muslim-led Bosnian government was incensed by the Croats' seizure of control in Busovaca and on May 12 openly condemned the HVO authorities for not handing control of the town over to the central government on demand.

The tensions in the Busovaca area were intensified by the Muslim failure to hold to the agreed upon plan for the distribution of arms from the former JNA arsenal in the area. Several similar incidents occurred elsewhere, resulting in small fights between Muslims and Croats over the distribution of the spoils resulting from the JNA's withdrawal. There was a Muslim-Croat confrontation at the Bratstvo armaments factory in Novi Travnik on June 18 when HVO elements attempted to prevent Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim-led government from removing from the factory arms the government intended to sell abroad. Two months later in August, HVO and Territorial Defense elements forced the turnover of the JNA arsenal at Slimena in Travnik. The arsenal had been mined by the JNA, and while the HVO tried to negotiate a surrender and the removal of the mines, TO elements broke into the factory and exploded them. In the aftermath of the debacle, the TO soldiers gathered up undamaged weapons parts, which they subse-quently reassembled to make whole weapons. One result of the consequent increase in the numbers of weapons in Muslim hands was an increase in confrontations in the area.

Representatives of the various Croat communities in central Bosnia met in Busovaca on September 22 to discuss the situation, particularly the growing tensions between Muslims and Croats resulting from one municipality or the other coming under the exclusive control of either Muslim or Bosnian Croat authorities. The conferees enumerated a number of general observations regarding the situation throughout the region. They noted in particular the need to revive the local economy and speed up preparations for winter in case they were totally cut off from Herzegovina and Croatia. They called for better coordination between HVO military and civilian authorities and uniformity of policy. Complaints were also made regarding the behavior of Muslims who acted ''as if they have an exclusive right to power in B and H and as if they are the only fighters for B and H," and regarding Muslim attempts to enforce their policies through the use of Croatian Defense Forces (HOS) elements. Special concern was aniculated regarding the daily arrival of new Muslim refugees in the area, as well as the increasing , presence of Muslim forces in the various towns while HVO forces were busy holding the lines against the BSA and HVO military authorities were being urged to prepare defense plans in case of confrontations with the Muslims.

In mid-October, three apparently unrelated incidents led to open fighting between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia. The first of these occurred in the town of Novi Travnik on October 18, and involved a dispute that began at a gas station near HVO headquarters. By mutual agreement, Muslims and Croats were sharing the region's fuel supplies. The conflict apparently broke out when Croats manning the gas station in Novi Travnik refused to provide gasoline to a Muslim Territorial Defense soldier. A squabble began, the Muslim was shot dead, and within minutes HVO and TO forces in Novi Travnik were engaged in a full-scale firefight in the town center. The fighting, led by Refik Lendo on the Muslim side, continued for several days despite the efforts of British UNPROFOR officers to bring it to a halt.

News of the fighting in Novi Travnik spread quickly throughout the region. Both Muslims and Croats erected roadblocks, mobilized local defense forces, and in some areas fired upon each other. Even so, the conflict rermained localized and uncoordinated, the Muslim and Croat forces in each town and village acting according to their own often faulty assessment of the situation. However, the situation worsened two days later when the commander of the HVO brigade in Travnik, Ivica Stojak, was assassinated on October 20 by mujahideen near Medresa, apparently on the orders of Col. Asim Koricic, commander of the 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade.1 From about the time Jajce fell, the newly arrived mujahideen had begun to appear in the Travnik area, and the number of small incidents between Muslims and Croats had risen substantially. Nevertheless, Stojak's assassination may have been personal rather than part of some larger Muslim plot against the HVO in Travnik.

Perhaps the most serious incident of the October outburst was the establishment of a roadblock by Muslim TO forces near the village of Ahmici on the main road through the Lasva Valley. The roadblock was established on October 20, and the TO forces manning it refused to let HVO forces en route to the defense of Jajce pass.2 The TO commander in the Ahmici area, Nijaz Sivro, was young and inexperienced, as was his deputy, Muniz Ahmic. Sivro had gone to the front lines against the Serbs in Visoko just before the roadblock at Ahmici was set up, and Ahmic was entrusted with the task of establishing the roadblock by the "Coordinating Committee for the Protection of Muslims." One Muslim officer characterized the setting up of the barricade as "ill-prepared and disorganized," and the initial confrontation at the Ahmici roadblock resulted in one Muslim soldier killed and several wounded. 'Two days later, October 22, the roadblock was removed without a fight, and HVO forces could again use the Lasva Valley road for mo ing troops to the Serb front. During the course of the altercation, the Muslim TO commander in Vitez told the UNPROFOR's Lt. Cot. Bob Stewart that Muslims had established the roadblock at Ahmici to prevent the HVO from reinforcing their forces then fighting in Novi Travnik. In fact, the establishment of the roadblock had been ordered by the ABiH zone headquarters in Zenica (later HQ, III Corps). 3

After several days of fighting and almost fifty casualties in the Lasva region, officers of the British UNPROFOR unit managed to negotiate a ceasefire on October 21 in the Vitez area that was then extended to Novi Travnik and the rest of the region. The Muslirn-Croat fighting had been widespread, but it appears to have been spontaneous rather than the result of a coordinated action by either side. Although a planned provocation by the Muslims, in and of itself the October 20 roadblock at Ahmici was a minor event. As far as the HVO authorities at the time were concerned, it was not a serious incident. It took on much greater significance, however, after HVO forces assaulted the village on April 16, 1993. Those who wished to portray the HVO as the aggressor in the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia have painted the October incident as a cause of the April, 1993 events, although the only real connection between the two is that they occurred in approximately the same location: the point at which the village of Ahmici touches the Vitez-Busovaca road at the narrowest part of the Lasva Valley.

One historian has characterized the period from January, 1992, up to the outbreak of Muslim-Croat hostilities in late January, 1993, as one in which "there was some 'pushing and shoving' between Croats and Muslims, and a lack of wholehearted cooperation as each group sought to stabilise and strengthen its own territory."4 Indeed, one can point to numerous small-scale local confrontations between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia during the course of 1992 designed to gain control over stockpiles of arms, munitions, and other military supplies; to gain control of key facilities or lines of communications; and to test the other side's will and capabilities to resist. Such incidents increased in frequency and intensity after Jajce fell on October 29, 1992, but they do not appear to have been part of a coordinated plan by either party. Indeed, they appear to be random, unconnected, and short-lived episodes resulting from the increasing level of tension and distrust between the two communities in central Bosnia. Even the build up of Muslim forces, the infiltration of armed ABiH soldiers and mujahideen into key villages and towns, and the suggestive positioning of ABiH units in central Bosnia went largely unnoticed by the HVO at the time.5 Only in retrospect do they appear to be part of a pattern of actions taken by the ABiH to prepare for the opening of an all-out Muslim offensive against the Croatian community in the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica region.

The ABiH Strategic Offensive Plan

Although its author and the date of its creation remain uncertain, events clearly reveal the existence of an ABiH strategic offensive against the HVO in central Bosnia that began in mid-January, 1993, and continued in several phases until the signing of the Washington Agreements in late February, 1994. The strategic objectives of the plan were:

1. To gain control of the north-south lines of communication (LOCs) passing through the Bosnian Croat enclave in central Bosnia, thereby linking the ABiH forces north of the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica Valleys with those to the south and securing the Muslim lines of communication to the outside world.
2. To gain control of the military industrial facilities in central Bosnia (the SPS explosives factory in Vitez and factories in Travnik and Novi Travnik) or on its periphery (factories in Bugojno, Gomji Vakuf, Prozor, Jablanica, Konjic, and Hadzici, among others) so as to facilitate the arming of the ABiH in the war against the Serbs.
3. To surround the Bosnian Croat enclave in central Bosnia and divide it into smaller pieces that could then be eliminated seriatim, thereby clearing the Croats from central Bosnia and providing a place for Muslim refugees expelled by the Serbs from other areas to settle.

Achieving the third objective would also ensure that the Muslims retained political control of central Bosnia so they could continue to dominate the RBiH's central government. There was probably also an anticipation of a peace agreement that would result in a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina among the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, in which case possession of the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica region would probably be tantamount to its inclusion in the Muslim area under any settlement, regardless of the area's former ethnic composition, a principle that was observed subsequently in areas seized by the Serbs. In fact, the area in question was part of Canton 10 , under the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and was assigned to the Croats, but at the time the Muslim offensive plan was devised and set in motion the issue was still undecided.6 In any event, occupation by the ABiH of the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica region would probably be cause for revision of the VOPP. In a larger and less sinister context, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's infant central government may simply have been eager to exert its authority over such territory as had not already been taken by the Bosnian Serbs. It should also be noted that the Croat enclaves in northern Bosnia posed no threat politically or militarily to the Muslim-led government and were useful for propaganda purposes to show the multiethnic composition and co-operation in the Muslim-led RBiH.

Such a complex and far-reaching plan could only have been worked out in the ABiH General Staff under the direction of Chief of Staff Sefer Halilovic, and further elaborated in Enver Hadzihasanovic's III Corps headquarters. Only they had the resources and expertise to prepare such a plan, and there are some indications that they had considered such a plan much earlier. By the time Jajce fell at the end of October, 1992, the ABiH's logistical situation was near collapse. The Izetbegovic government had failed to induce the United Nations to cancel its arms embargo or to intervene militarily, and, despite Chief of Staff Halilovic's persistent entreaties, had done little to mobilize the Bosnian economy for war. Too weak to seize the arms and equipment it needed from the far more powerful Bosnian Serb army, the ABiH still had sufficient strength to overpower its erstwhile ally, the HVO-at least in the central Bosnia area. Success in such an endeavor would solve two of the most pressing logistical problems. First, it would provide an immediate gain in arms and other equipment, which could be quickly turned against the Serbs. Second, it would open the ABiH's lines of communications through central Bosnia, thereby facilitating the more effective deployment of available ABiH troops, armaments, and supplies, as well as the importation of arms, ammunition, and other vital supplies obtained on the international arms market. Moreover, General Halilovic's associates on the ABiH General Staff had long since identified Kiseljak, Busovaca, Vitez, and Vares as the site for refugee settlements. In the summer of 1992, two of Halilovic's subordinates, Rifat Bilajac and Zicro Suljevic, attended a meeting at SDA headquarters in Sarajevo to discuss the refugee situation. Halilovic relates that they returned to the headquarters infuriated, Bilajac stating angrily:I was informed about everything in the SDA headquarters. There were some 10-12 members of the executive committee present, and when I suggested that refugee settlements should be built in Kiseljak, Busovaca, Vitez and Vares, Behmen tells me nicely: 'It can't be there, as that's Croat national territory.' The other members were silent. Then we quarreled and left the meeting. Well, what are we dying for if this is Croat national territory?"7

As to the question of when such a plan might have been conceived, it is important to note that the ABiH III Corps first openly attacked HVO forces in the Lasva Valley in late January, 1993. A significant amount of time, probably not less than two months, would have been required to assemble and prepare the forces necessary for an offensive on the scale of the January attacks. Thus, the basic plan needed to have been completed no later than November 1, 1992, suggesting that the necessary planning was already in progress even before Jajce fell. It seems likely, therefore, that the concept of the ABiH strategic offensive against the HVO in central Bosnia was developed in the late summer or early fall of 1992 and that the “go-no go" decision was probably made in early November-soon after the fall of Jajce.

The HVO Reaction

While the ABiH was clearly the aggressor in the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia, the HVO commanders did not sit idly by waiting to be overrun by their more numerous Muslim opponents. Instead they adopted what is known in U.S. military parlance as an "active defense” that is, a defense in which the defender actively and continuously seeks to improve his defensive posture by seizing and controlling key terrain and lines of communication, degrading the enemy's offensive capabilities, and acting aggressively to spoil enemy attacks and keep the enemy off balance.8 To an observer on the ground who did not understand the overall strategic situation-particularly one prone to rash judgments and broad inferences-the HVO's conduct of the active defense might well appear to have been offensive in nature. Yet, the fact is, it was largely reactive and preventive.

Thus, from an HVO perspective the strategic battle was entirely a defensive one, albeit marked by selective use of preemptive spoiling attacks (pre- ventivi), counterattacks, and other offensive actions designed to support the Croat defensive strategy by the conduct of an “active defense" rather than a purely positional defense in the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica Valleys. Surrounded, heavily outnumbered (by as much as eight or ten to one according to some accounts), and logistically bankrupt, it would have been com- pletely illogical for the Croats to try to mount a systematic campaign to expand the enclave or to ethnically cleanse Muslims from the Lasva Valley, much less from all of the proposed Canton 10. One former HVO officer has said that an HVO commander would have had to be "insane” to have contemplated an offensive against the Muslims given their tenuous manpower, logistics, and full deployment against the Serbs.9 They were barely able to repel the repeated Muslim attacks and were certainly too weak in numbers, arms, and ammunition to attempt a major offensive. Nevertheless, the hard-pressed HVO forces did manage to mount a number of small offensive actions to secure better defensive positions, prevent the Muslims from obtaining their objectives, and to clear their rear areas of troublesome Muslim enclaves. Generally, a clear military necessity can be shown for each of those offensive actions. More commonly, the HVO forces simply took up defensive positions and repelled a series of increasingly heavy Muslim attacks that inexorably whittled away the territory held by the HVO, inflicted casualties, and slowly asphyxiated the Bosnian Croat defenders.

________________________________

1 Ljubas, Kordic-Cerkez trial testimony, May 16, 2000; Filipovic, Kordic-Cerkez trial testimony, Apr 11, 2000.
2 Zeko, Blaskic trial testimony, Sept. 11, 1998.
3 Maj. Sulejman Kalco, Kodic-Cerkez trial testimony, Mar. 7, 2000. Kalco was deputy commander of the Muslim forces in Stari Vitez in 1993. He later retired from the Federation Army.
4 O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia, 48
5 Major Zeko, the HQ, OZCB, intelligence officer at the time, noted that although he mentioned to his superiors several times the growing disadvantage of the HVO position in the area due to Muslim infiltration and the positioning of ABiH forces to the rear of HVO units defending the front against the Serbs, there did not appear to be any urgent reaction on the part of the HVO leadership (conversation with author, Split, Aug. 17, 1999)
6 The Vance-Owen Peace Plan canton map was not agreed upon until January 10-12, 1993.
8 Halilovic, Lukava Strategija, 78. See also the comments of journalist Ed Vulliamy regarding the "grand scheme" of Mehmed Alagic, a senior ABiH commander in central Bosnia, for "consolidation of the Muslim triangle in central Bosnia" (Seasons in Hell, 257-58)
8 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, 3, defines "active defense" as: "The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy". Indeed, the former commander of OZ Northwest Herzegovina used the term exactly in its American sense to describe the series of small counterattacks and other offensive actions taken by the HVO in the Lasva-Kozica-Lepenica Valleys and elsewhere (Maj. Gen. Zeljko Siljeg, conversation with author, Medjugorje, Aug. 23, 1999)
9 Zeko conversation, Aug. 27, 1999.
 

S E A R C H

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